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ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARDS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment may be granted 
if the trial court determines that the pleadings and evidence demonstrate "that there is no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law." Utah R.Civ.P. 56(c). Any doubts or uncertainties regarding whether issues 
of fact are genuinely disputed must be resolved in favor of the non-moving party. Atlas 
Corp. v. Clovis National Bank. 737 P.2d 225, 229 (Utah 1987). 
The issue in this case is whether genuine issues of material fact exist; not, as 
argued by the Appellees, what the eventual standard of proof at trial would be. See 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 9. Appellate courts in Utah have long held that a trial court should not 
weigh disputed evidence in considering motions for summary judgment, but "its sole inquiry 
should be whether material issues of fact exist." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 
P.2d 1283,1292 (Utah App. 1996V (citing Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888P.2d 1097, 
1100 (Utah 1995)). This Court quoted the Bernardo court as follows: 
"[i]t is not the purpose of the summary judgment procedure to judge the credibility of 
the averments of the parties, or witnesses, or the weight of the evidence. Neither is it 
to deny the right to a trial to resolve disputed issues of fact. Its purpose is to eliminate 
the time, trouble[,] and expense of trial when upon any view taken of the facts as 
asserted by the party ruled against, he would not be entitled to prevail." 
Id., at 1101 (citing Holbrook Co. v. Adams. 542P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1975). Likewise, this 
Court quoted the Holbrook court for the principle that "it only takes one sworn statement 
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under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the controversy and create an issue 
of fact. Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1292 (quoting Holbrooke 542 P.2d at 193). 
II. GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXIST 
The parties do not dispute the elements necessary to maintain an action for malicious 
prosecution. They are: 
(1) A criminal proceeding instituted or continued by the defendant against the 
plaintiff; (2) termination of the proceeding in favor of the accused; (3) absence of 
probable cause for the proceeding; and (4) malice, or a primary purpose other than 
that of bringing an offender to justice. 
America Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler. 768 P.2d 950, 959 (Utah App. 1989). This is 
perhaps the only matter in which there is no dispute between the parties. 
The elements for malicious prosecution involve fact-sensitive issues. "Fact-sensitive 
cases . . . do not lend themselves to a determination on summary judgment." Draper City v. 
Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d at 1101. The Appellants' and Appellees' briefs demonstrate, 
as does the record on appeal, that genuinely disputed issues exist between the parties. 
A. Probable Cause 
Meshwerks claims that Agler and Olson 1) took property of Meshwerks; 2) knew the 
property was proprietary; and 3) took the propriety without the knowledge or consent of 
Meshwerks. Appellee's Brief, p. 12. Agler and Olson asserted that they made copies of 
programs, scripts and files, with Meshwerks' knowledge and took them out of the office so 
they could work on them outside of the office. R. 484-485, 491-492. Meshwerks loaded 
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software onto Olson's computer. R. 485. Meshwerks never expressed a concern or 
disapproval about this practice, but in fact supported it. R. 484-485, 491-492. 
Agler and Olson denied stealing "tools" from Meshwerks. R. 486-487, 492-494. 
Moreover, even assuming arguendo that Agler and Olson took any tools, they believed that 
Meshwerk consented to employees copying and taking such tools with them when they left 
employment at Meshwerks. R. 486, 493. 
Immediately before leaving employment with Meshwerks, Agler copied the models 
he had made. R. 493. This demonstrates that Agler did not believe the models belonged to 
Meshwerks, and/or that he had permission to do so based on Meshwerks5 prior conduct 
implying consent to copy the models. Olson and Agler testified that they had implied consent 
to copy models and take them home to work on them, and that Meshwerks never expressed 
any concern about this practice. R. 487, 494. Meshwerks failure to express any concern 
about this practice could reasonably connote that they had permission to take the information. 
Agler and Olson denied that the models were proprietary. R. 453. The lack of 
concern or disapproval of copying files, and the lack of any confidentiality agreements, non-
disclosure and/or non-compete agreements, policies, procedures, guidelines or writings of 
any kind stating that the models, scripts, files, preferences, etc., were proprietary, to be 
safeguarded, kept confidential or otherwise protected gives rise to a reasonable inference that 
such information was not proprietary. Moreover, the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Central Division in Meshwerks. Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A.. Inc.. et 
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aL, recently ruled that models at issue were not copyrightable by Meshwerks because the 
digital models created by Meshwerks were not original. See, Meshwerks, Inc. v. Toyota 
Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., etal, Order & Memorandum Decision, Case No. 2:06 CV 97, page 
9, September 12, 2006. A copy of the decision is attached in the Addendum to this brief. 
The foregoing manifests the genuine dispute regarding whether probable cause existed 
for Meshwerks to initiate criminal proceedings against Agler and Olson. Accordingly, it was 
error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of Meshwerks. 
B. Malice 
Meshwerks asserts there was no malice in initiating a criminal action against Agler 
and Olson. Appellees5 Brief, pp. 1920. Olson believed that Meshwerks' reporting of 
criminal action was not based on fact, but on Meshwerks5 ill-feeling about them leaving their 
employment with Meshwerks and a potential loss of income for Meshwerks. R. 489. Agler 
and Olson sought additional time to conduct discovery on the issues raised in Meshwerks5 
summary judgment motion, and to show that Meshwerks acted with malice in reporting that 
Agler and Olson committed theft. R. 475-477. 
Utah courts have held that the malice element is an inherently factual issue and must 
go to the jury for determination. See, e ^ , Uhr. v. Eaton, 80 P.2d 925, 929 (Utah 1938) 
(stating, whether defendant acted maliciously in accusing plaintiff of poisoning defendant's 
dog was an issue for the jury); Thomas v. Frost, 27 P.2d 459,463 (Utah 1933) (stating, where 
there was evidence, though contradicted, that defendant in presenting matter to county 
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attorney did not make truthful statement of facts, the question of malice held for the jury). 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held, "In proving malice in a civil action it is not 
necessary to prove actual spite, ill will, or grudge, but it is only necessary to prove wrongful 
or improper motive" Johnson v. Mount Ogden Enterprises. Inc.. 460 P.2d 333, 335 (Utah 
1969) (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court further held: 
To sustain a charge of malicious prosecution, proof of evil motive, hatred, spite or ill 
will is not necessarily required, although because of difficulty of overt proof of such 
matters, evil motive may be implied from the wrongful act of filing a criminal 
complaint without reasonable justification for doing so. 
Potter v. Utah Drive-Ur-Self System. Inc.. 355 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1960). Also, "Malice 
may be implied or inferred from want of probable cause." Quermbeck v. Hanson. 75 P.2d 
1027, 1030 (Utah 1938). As argued in Agler' and Olson's Appellants' Brief and before the 
trial court, issues of fact exist regarding whether Meshwerks had a "wrongful or improper 
motive" in instituting the criminal action against Plaintiffs. Those issues included negative 
financial impact to Meshwerks by Agler's and Olson's departure, unwanted competition from 
Agler and Olson, loss of expertise and leadership at Meshwerks with Agler's and Olson's 
departure, evidence of Meshworks' malice based on comments made by witnesses to Agler 
and Olson, and inconsistencies between information in Meshwerks' police report and 
testimony in the trial court. R. 472-473, 476. 
Whether Meshwerks acted with malice in instituting a criminal action against Agler 
and Olson was and is a disputed material fact making summary judgment improper. 
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C. Abuse of Process 
As set forth above, genuine issues existed as to whether Meshwerks acted with an 
ulterior or improper purpose in instituting a criminal action charging Agler and Olson with 
theft. R. 472-473, 476, 487, 489. Hence, summary judgment on this issue was improper. 
Meshwerk's report of Agler and Olson committing theft (use of process) was contrary 
to practices of allowing employees to copy and take files, models, preferences and tools. 
Meshwerks knew that Agler and Olson did not take tools. Meshwerks knew that the 
information/property at issue was not proprietary, particularly when it took no steps to 
safeguard such information. A genuine issue of fact exists regarding whether Meshwerks 
abused legal process in accusing Agler and Olson of theft. 
III. DENIAL OF APPELLANTS' RULE 56(f) MOTION 
Meshwerks argues that this issue is not properly reviewable by this Court because 
Agler and Olson failed to request a transcript of the hearing held March 6, 2006, regarding 
the summary judgment motion and Rule 56(f) motion. Meshwerks provides no authority to 
support this argument. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 11(e)(2) requires a transcript of all evidence 
regarding a challenged finding or conclusion by the trial court. No evidence was presented 
at the March 6, 2006 hearing. It was an oral argument hearing. R. 517, 519, 522. 
Meshwerks did not oppose Agler's and Olson's Rule 56(f) motion. No findings or 
conclusions were entered by the trial court in denying the motion, so it is unclear why the 
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trial court did so. R. 523-524. 
Meshwerks next argues that the trial court properly denied Agler's and Olson's Civil 
Rule 56 (f) motion because they were dilatory in pursuing discovery. Appellees' Brief, pp. 
This claim is without merit. 
The complaint was filed in the trial court on May 31,2005. R. 1-7. The answer was 
filed July 11, 2005. R. 14-16. The Case Management Order was entered on August 29, 
2005. R. 17-19. The parties exchanged initial disclosures the end of September and 
designated witnesses during the first two-and-a-half weeks in October, 2005. R. 20-26. The 
Case Management Order set a discovery completion date of January 31, 2006. Agler and 
Olson served Meshwerks with their First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production 
on October 20,2005, and that Meshwerks served their responses on November 14,2005. R. 
27-29. Meshwerks then filed its motion for summary judgment on November 16,2005. R. 
30-397. Agler and Olson filed their oppostion to the motion for summary judgment and their 
Rule 56(f) motion on December 16,2005. R. 451-496. Meshwerks filed its reply to Agler's 
and Olson's opposition to the summary judgment motion, but filed no opposition to their 
Rule 56(f) motion. R. 497-506. 
Trial courts should liberally grant Rule 56(f) motions requesting a continuance to 
complete discovery before ruling on a motion for summary judgment unless the Rule 56(f) 
motion is dilatory or lacking in merit. Price Development Co., L.P. v. Orem City, 995 P.2d 
1237, 1248 (Utah 2000), Salt Lake City v. Western Dairvment Cooperative. Inc.. 48 P.3d 
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910, 917 (Utah 2002). Here, Meshwerks did not oppose the Rule 56(f) motion, or argue in 
the trial court that it was dilatory or lacking in merit, but raises it now for the first time on 
appeal. Meshwerks does not allege or argue that it was plain error for the trial court not to 
rule that Agler's and Olson's Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory or lacking merit, or that 
exceptional circumstances exist to raise if for the first time on appeal; nor could it credibly 
do so. Accordingly this argument should not be considered by this Court on appeal. Walter 
v. Stewart, 67 P.3d 1042, 1049, (Utah App. 2003), cert, denied, 73 P.3d 946 (2003). 
Where a Rule 56(f) motion is not meritless or dilatory on its face, the requesting party 
has properly invoked the trial court's discretion, and the matter must be reversed and 
remanded for consideration on the merits of the motion. Energy Management Services, 
L.L.C.v. Shaw, 110 P.3d 158,160-61 (Utah App. 2005). Meshwerks has not argued that the 
motion was meritless. The record in this matter demonstrates that Agler and Olson followed 
a reasonable course in filing the Rule 56(f) motion given the procedural status of the case. 
Id., at 161. They had initiated discovery proceedings and received Meshwerks' responses 
just two days before receiving the motion for summary judgment. R. 27-29, 32. They filed 
the Rule 56(f) motion along with their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. R. 
451-480. Agler and Olson were not dilatory. 
Agler and Olson reasonably relied on Meshwerks' non-opposition to the Rule 56(f) 
motion in not conducting further discovery between January 6,2006, the date of Meshwerks' 
filing its reply to Agler's and Olson's opposition to the motion for summary judgment, and 
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the January 31, 2006 discovery completion deadline. Thus, based on the short time period 
between the filing of the complaint and the filing of its motion for summary judgment, and 
the extensiveness of the motion, that the Rule 56(f) motion was not dilatory or lacking in 
merit. 
Given there was no opposition by Meshwerks, and no finding or conclusion by the 
trial court that the Rule 56(f) motion was dilatory or lacking in merit, the trial court abused 
its discretion in denying the motion. Accordingly, the denial of the motion must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the Appellants' Brief and in this Reply Brief, genuine 
issues of material fact existed which precluded the trial court's granting summary judgment 
to Meshwerks. Moreover, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Agler's and Olson's 
Rule 56(f) motion. Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the trial court's 
Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Denying Plaintiffs' Rule 
56(f) motion, and the subsequent Judgment dismissing Appellants' complaint with prejudice. 
RESEPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3 J - day ofSeptember, 2006. 
HILL, JOffifS(^Ufe-SGHMUTZ, L.C. 
Stephen E. Quesenbeffy 
E^/Sc^t Davis 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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Case 2:06-cv-00097-TC Document 44 Filed 09/13/2006 Page 1 of 10 
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
MESHWERKS, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
^ 
ORDER & MEMORANDUM DECISION 
vs. 
TOYOTA MOTOR SALES U.S.A., INC, a 
California corporation, GRACE & WILD, 
INC., d/b/a "DIVISION X," a Michigan 
corporation, 3D RECON, L.L.C, a Utah 
limited liability company, SAATCHI & 
SAATCHI NORTH AMERICA, INC, a 
California corporation, and JOHN DOES 1-
10, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 2:06 CV 97 
This motion raises the question of whether copyright law protects three-dimensional 
digital models of commercial products when the digital models are intended to resemble the 
commercial product as closely as possible. Plaintiff Meshwerks, Inc., was hired by Defendant 
Grace & Wild, Inc. to create digital models of several Toyota vehicles. After completing the 
project, Meshwerks obtained copyright registration certificates covering the models. Meshwerks 
contends that Defendants Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., Grace & Wild, 3D Recon, L.L.C, 
and Saatchi & Saatchi North America, Inc. (collectively, the "Toyota Defendants") violated 
Meshwerks's copyright by impermissibly using the models that Meshwerks created. Meshwerks 
also alleges that Grace & Wild failed to fully pay Meshwerks for the digital modeling that it 
performed. 
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The Toyota Defendants have moved for summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright 
infringement claims, asserting that the digital models created by Meshwerks are not 
copyrightable. Further, the Toyota Defendants argue that, should they succeed on their motion 
for summary judgment, the court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Meshwerks's remaining state law claim for breach of contract. The court agrees with the Toyota 
Defendants' position and therefore grants the motion for summary judgment and declines to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meshwerks's breach of contract claim. 
Background 
As part of its advertising strategy, Toyota Motor Sales and its advertising agent, Saatchi 
& Saatchi sought out a company to create three-dimensional animated images of several Toyota 
vehicles. Toyota planned on using the models on the Internet and in several other types of 
promotional media. Saatchi & Saatchi contacted Grace & Wild and asked it to develop the 
images. Grace & Wild, in turn, hired Meshwerks to create three-dimensional digital models of 
the Toyota vehicles that would be used to create the final images. 
The parties present different descriptions of the digital-modeling process. The Toyota 
Defendants assert that the use of off-the-shelf computer software enables the quick creation of 
product-accurate models. In contrast, Meshwerks claims that computer software is used to create 
an initial rough sketch of an object, but that "the skill and creativity of the graphic sculptor," who 
uses computer software as a tool, creates the final product. (Plf.'s Memo, in Opp'n to the Toyota 
Defs. Mot. for Part. Summ. J. ii (dkt. #19).) 
Meshwerks began the modeling process by measuring the physical distance between 
designated points on each Toyota vehicle. To accomplish this task, Meshwerks placed tape in a 
grid pattern over each car and then, using an articulated arm measuring over six feet, marked 
2 
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each point at which the tape intersected. The distance between the points of intersection was 
then measured and inputted into a computer. Using the measurements as a guide, the computer 
software then created lines that formed a rough digital representation of the vehicle, resembling a 
wireframe model.1 
According to Meshwerks, the individual creating the digital model must manipulate the 
data initially obtained from the vehicle measurements to effectively create the illusion of a three-
dimensional image on a two-dimensional screen in the most efficient manner possible. Given the 
necessity of manipulating the data obtained through measurement alone, Meshwerks disputes the 
Toyota Defendants' characterization of the final digital models as absolutely product accurate. In 
fact, Meshwerks contends that truly product-accurate models would be worthless because they 
would not create the desired three-dimensional effect. In short, Meshwerks asserts that the 
modeling process is a creative one, and that the creative nature of the process is borne out by the 
fact that no two digital models of an object will be exactly alike. 
After finishing the vehicle models, Meshwerks provided the digital files to Saatchi & 
Saatchi. Meshwerks also made a print-out of the data comprising each of the digital files and 
sought copyright protection of the material, claiming that the print-outs represented 
copyrightable non-dramatic literary works or computer programs. The United States Copyright 
Office issued copyright registration certificates to Meshwerks covering the submitted files. 
Meshwerks's copyright infringement claim is based on Meshwerks's belief that the 
digital models it created have been distributed among the Toyota Defendants and that those 
'According to Meshwerks, some components of the vehicles, such as the vehicles' headlights, could not be 
measured. Meshwerks took photographs of those components and then, using the photographs for reference, 
created the wireframe model of the components from scratch. 
3 
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models have been used repeatedly without Meshwerks's permission. The Toyota Defendants 
claim that summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright infringement claims is warranted 
because the digital models are not entitled to copyright protection. 
Summary Judgment Standard 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 permits the entry of summary judgment "if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.'" Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-51 (1986); Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 
(10th Cir. 1998). The court must "examine the factual record and reasonable inferences 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Applied 
Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First Affiliated Sec, Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th Cir. 1990). 
The parties do not truly dispute the material facts underlying Meshwerks's copyright 
claim. Rather, the parties dispute the manner in which those facts are characterized. The only 
disagreement between the parties concerns whether the process of creating the digital models is 
dominated by creativity or technical know-how. But even the Toyota Defendants acknowledge 
that the modeling process is not entirely mechanical in nature. (See Reply Memo, in Supp. of 
Defs. Mot. for Part. Summ. J. 11 (dkt. #25) ("In a manner of speaking, it took 'creative 
judgments' to decide how best to depict the three-dimensional Vehicle in a two-dimensional 
display.").) The parties' disagreement concerning the accurate characterization of the modeling 
process does not preclude the entry of summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright 
infringement claim. This is so because, even if Meshwerks's characterization of the modeling 
4 
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process is accepted as accurate, the digital models are nevertheless not copyrightable.2 
Accordingly this matter can be resolved on summary judgment. See Magic Mktg., Inc. v. 
Mailing Servs. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769 (W.D. Pa. 1986) ("The issue of 
copyrightability is typically resolved by a motion for summary judgment."); cf Sem-Torq, Inc. 
v K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1991) ("Copyrightability is often resolved on 
summary judgment."). 
Analysis 
I. Copyright Infringement 
The Copyright Act provides that "[cjopyright protection subsists . . . in original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed, from 
which they can be perceived, reproduced or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the 
aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). "To qualify for copyright protection, a work 
must be original to the author." Feist Pub., Inc. v. Rural Tele. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 
(1991) (citing Harper & Row, Pubs., Inc. v. Nat. Enterps., 471 U.S. 539, 547-49 (1985)). In fact, 
originality is "[t]he sine qua non of copyright." Id. The requirement of originality is met if the 
author created the work and the creation involved a creative component. Slee id. ("Original. . . 
means only that the work was independently created by the author . .. and . .. possesses at least 
some minimal degree of creativity."). With regard to the presence of creativity, the United States 
Supreme Court has stated: "To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a 
2Meshwerks filed a motion to strike portions of the declaration of Brent Feeman, which was submitted by 
the Toyota Defendants in support of their motion for partial summary judgment. In an apparent attempt to address 
the concerns raised by Meshwerks, the Toyota Defendants responded by submitting a supplemental declaration of 
Mr Feeman But Meshwerks contends that the supplemental declaration suffers from deficiencies similar to those 
present in Mr Feeman's first declaration Nevertheless, because the court does not rely on the paragraphs of Mr 
Feeman's declaration that Meshwerks seeks to strike and because the court adopts Meshwerks's recitation and 
characterization of the digital modeling process, the motion to strike Mr Feeman's declaration is denied as moot 
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slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they 
possess some creative spark, no matter how crude, humble, or obvious it might be." Id. (internal 
quotation omitted). 
The parties devote some time in their briefs to the presence of a presumption of copyright 
protection flowing from the registration certificates obtained by Meshwerks. See Grundberg v. 
Upjohn Co., 137 F.R.D. 372, 382 (D. Utah 1991) ("The registration certificate is prima 
facie evidence of copyright validity.") The effect of the presumption in this case is not in 
dispute. The Toyota Defendants have the burden of proving that the digital models created by 
Meshwerks are not copyrightable. See id. ("[T]he presumption is not absolute: 'possession of a 
registration certificate creates a rebuttable presumption that the work in question is 
copyrightable.'" (quoting Whimsicality Inc. v. Rubie's Costume Co., 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 
1989))). The Toyota Defendants attack the copyrightability of the Meshwerks models on 
creativity grounds, contending that the models fail to "make the grade," because they do not 
exhibit the "creative spark" that serves as the necessary predicate for copyright protection, Feist, 
499 U.S. at 345. 
In support of their position, the Toyota Defendants cite ATC Distribution Group, Inc. v. 
Whatever It Takes Transmissions & Parts, Inc., 402 F.3d 700 (6th Cir. 2005), in which an auto 
parts dealer claimed that a competitor copied illustrations used in an auto parts catalog. See id. at 
702-03, 712. The illustrations in ATC Distribution Group were "hand-drawn sketches of 
transmissions parts," that were originally "copied from photographs cut out of competitors' 
catalogs." Id. In reaching the conclusion that the hand-drawn illustrations were not entitled to 
copyright protection, the Sixth Circuit focused on the lack of creative intent, stating that "[t]he 
illustrations were intended to be as accurate as possible in reproducing the parts shown in the 
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photographs on which they were based, a form of slavish copying that is the antithesis of 
originality." Id. (citing J. Thomas Distribs. v. Greenline Distribs., 100 F.3d 956 (6th Cir. 1996), 
available at No. 95-2100, 1996 WL 636138 at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 31, 1996) (unpublished opinion) 
("Plaintiffs spindle bearing was drawn with the express intention of duplicating on paper the 
appearance of an actual spindle bearing. Its reproduction involved absolutely no creative spark 
whatsoever.")). 
Meshwerks contends that its modeling process involved much more that mere "slavish 
copying," id Instead, Meshwerk analogizes its process to that undertaken by commercial 
photographers. In particular, Meshwerks relies on SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc., 117 
F. Supp. 2d 301 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), in which the court held that product photographs of mirrored 
picture frames were entitled to copyright protection, id. at 311. 
The court in SHL Imaging, Inc. began its analysis with the acknowledgment that "[tjhere 
is no uniform test to determine the copyrightability of photographs." Id. at 309-10. Citing the 
"almost limitless creative potential" offered by the medium of photography, the court 
commented that u[t]he elements that combine to satisfy Feist's minimal 'spark of creativity' 
standard will necessarily vary depending on the photographer's creative choices." SHL Imaging, 
Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d at 310. The court went on to state that "[t]he cumulative impact of these 
technical and artistic choices becomes manifest in renowned portraits, such as 'Oscar Wilde 18.' 
The measure or originality becomes more difficult to gauge as one moves from sublime 
expression to simple reproduction." Id. 
The SHL Imaging, Inc. court viewed the product photographs that were the subject of the 
parties' dispute as less than sublime expression, but much more than simple reproduction. See 
id. at 311 ("While Lindner's works may not be as creative as a portrait by Dianne Arbus, they 
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show artistic judgment and therefore meet the Feist standard."). In reaching its conclusion that 
the product photographs were protected by copyright, the court focused on the artistic choices 
made by the photographer. See id. at 311 ("What makes plaintiffs photographs original is the 
totality of the precise lighting selection, angle of the camera, lens and filter selection."). 
Nevertheless, the court noted that the copyright protection afforded to the photographs was 
narrow, stating that "[pjlaintiff cannot prevent others from photographing the same frames, or 
using the same lighting techniques and blue sky reflection in the mirrors[;]. . . [pjractically, the 
plaintiffs works are only protected from verbatim copying." Id. 
The models created by Meshwerks are more analogous to the illustrations in ATP 
Distribution Group than to the photographs in SHL Imaging, Inc. The critical distinction 
between the present case and SHL Imaging, Inc. is the lack of a creative recasting of the Toyota 
vehicles. The photographer in SHL Imaging, Inc. used his camera to introduce new creative 
elements that elevated his photographs beyond mere replication. The illustrators in ATC 
Distribution Group, on the other hand, utilized their skill to reproduce, as accurately as possible, 
the auto parts they were attempting to depict. Similarly, in this case, Meshwerks's intent was to 
replicate, as exactly as possible, the image of certain Toyota vehicles. Although the tools used 
by the illustrators in ATC Distribution Group vary from the digital-modeling tools used by 
Meshwerks, the endeavor was identical: product-accurate representation without the introduction 
of new creative elements. 
Todd v. Montana Silversmiths, Inc., 379 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (D. Colo. 2005), provides a 
helpful example of the distinction drawn in copyright law between skilled craft and creative, 
protectable, works. In Todd, a jewelry maker claimed that a competitor had impermissibly 
copied jewelry that the plaintiff had designed to resemble barbed wire. Id. at 1111. The court 
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concluded that the plaintiffs design was not protected by copyright law. See id. at 1113-14. 
According to the Todd court, "[w]hile Plaintiff is no doubt a skilled artist capable of making 
jewelry with a certain aesthetic appeal, she has failed to show what copyrightable features she 
has added to her work to separate it from ordinary public domain barbed-wire." Id. at 1113. The 
court, while acknowledging the skill and judgment involved in the design process, nevertheless 
declined to extend copyright protection to the unoriginal result of that process, stating that "[t]he 
fact remains that for all her aesthetic choices, the final arrangement of the elements in her jewelry 
still corresponds to the arrangement of public domain barbed-wire." Id. 
Like the jeweler in Todd, Meshwerks no doubt made many judgments that required both 
skill and technical know-how. Those judgments may have even involved "creativity," as that 
word is commonly used. But the digital models created by Meshwerks are not original. Just as 
the jewelry in Todd ultimately corresponded to common barbed-wire, the digital models created 
by Meshwerks correspond to the Toyota vehicles they were intended to represent. Accordingly, 
Meshwerks's models are not protected by copyright law and the Toyota Defendants are entitled 
to summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright claims. 
II. State Law Claims 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) allows federal district courts to decline exercising jurisdiction over 
state law claims when "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In this case, the only cause of action alleged by 
Meshwerks that is not dependent on federal copyright law is a breach of contract claim against 
Grace & Wild. Meshwerks's complaint does not allege that this court has original jurisdiction 
over that contract claim. Given the court's ruling on Meshwerks's copyright claims, the court 
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declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meshwerks's contract claim. Accordingly, 
Meshwerks's contract claim is dismissed. 
Conclusion 
Although a great deal of skill and effort was involved in the creation of Meshwerks's 
three-dimensional digital models, those models do not meet the originality requirement 
established by copyright law. Accordingly, the models are not entitled to copyright protection. 
As a result, the Toyota Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Meshwerks's copyright 
claims. Further, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Meshwerks's 
breach of contract claim and that claim is therefore dismissed. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Toyota Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
and Dismissal of Remaining Claim (dkt. #11) is GRANTED and Plaintiffs Motion to Strike 
Feeman Declaration (dkt. #17) is DENIED as moot. 
DATED this 12th day of September, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
TENA CAMPBELL 
United States District Judge 
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